Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons. This is an inventory and critical analysis of the claims made about the weapons and programmes that Iraq is proscribed from having under the terms of Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), paragraphs. 10 and 12: that is, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km. It is not about Iraq's overall compliance with that resolution or subsequent resolutions on Iraq, including SCR 1441 (2002). For example, it does not attempt to analyse the extent of Iraq's obstruction of inspectors from UNSCOM, UNMOVIC or IAEA. It is instead a presentation of what is actually known about the weapons and programmes themselves. For the UN inspectors currently in Iraq, discovering what is unknown about the history and present status of these items is the task at hand. Inspectors must engage with the possibility of Iraq's retention or development of non-conventional weapons, and report to the Security Council on this basis. However, a set of evaluations can also be made of the likelihood of Iraq's non-conventional weapons programmes, given the material available. No overall judgements are made in this reference file, but material is presented that should allow a more well informed opinion to be reached. By Glen Rangwala.

By Project on Defense Alternatives , US.

Defense Policy Resource.

Options for dealing with North Korea. How should the West discourage North Korea developing nuclear weapons? Bribery hasn't worked in the past. Military strikes would be extremely risky. Economic sanctions would make little impact on an autarky like North Korea. Ted Galen Carpenter recommends encouraging South Korea and Japan to make their own decisions about developing nuclear weapons and the US withdrawing from North East Asia - thus deterring North Korea or creating a nuclear balance of power in the region.

By Cato Institute , US, North Korea.

Defense Policy Resource.