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Latin America’s Dueling Development Banks
1 June 2007. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez proposed a regional development bank in the same March 2007 speech announcing his country’s withdrawal from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Clearly, he hoped the so-called Bank of the South would supersede the two Western-dominated lenders. By Stephanie Hanson.
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By CFR, USA.
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Macro Economic policy Resource.
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| Federal Revenue and Spending"
Want to know how the Federal government is raising and spending your money? This excellent web resource from the Heritage Foundation details the rise of federal spending, trends in taxation and borrowing. Brian M. Riedl, Rea Hederman and Ethan Baker provide the data in "Federal Revenue and Spending: A Book of Charts". | By Heritage Foundation, US. | Macro Economic Policy Resource. |
| Asset Bubbles "
Hans-Joachim Voth examines five bubbles that eventually popped, and discuses the feasibility of central bank policy. In all cases, he finds that monetary policy was too loose during the period when the bubble was developing, and that a determined switch from an accommodating to a tight stance caused "the music to stop". Despite the severe real effects of asset bubbles in all five examples, it is argued that the case for targeting them explicitly is weak. "A Tale of Five Bubbles - Asset Price Inflation and Central Bank Policy in Historical Perspective" is published by the Centre for Economic Policy Research. | By Centre for Economic Policy Research , Sweden, UK, Germany, Japan, US. | Macro Economic Policy Resource. |
| Argentina's Crisis "
Kurt Schuler sets out a programme of reforms which are designed to restore confidence in Argentina's economy. These include dollarization, reforming the financial system, and tax reductions. "Fixing Argentina" is published by the Cato Institute. | By Cato Institute , US. | Macro Economic Policy Resource. |
| Privatizing Banking Regulation
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Bert Ely argues for the privatization of prudential banking regulation. The present system whereby some banks are, in effect, deemed to big to fail has a strong moral hazard element - whereby banks are encouraged to take more risks because of this implicit guarantee. He proposes a system of cross-guarantee deposit insurance. Under this system an individual bank would negotiate a prudential regulatory contract with a syndicate of of guarantors - largely other banks. The syndicate would guarantee against loss of bank deposits. In return the syndicate would receive a negotiated risk-sensitive insurance premium. | By Bert Ely , US | Macro Economic Policy Resource. |
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